Ajwad assesses the effectiveness of core social protection programs in Uttar Pradesh using the following criteria: i) coverage, ii) targeting efficiency; and iii) adequacy and potential impact on household welfare. The study is largely a quantitative assessment. Five main findings emerge from the study. First, many of the social safety net programs implemented in Uttar Pradesh have very low coverage rates, which in turn imply that exclusion errors are very large. Second, although the beneficiaries are disproportionately from poor households, non-poor households are benefiting from the program -hence, inclusion errors are also a problem. Third, across caste groupings, program beneficiaries from SC/ST households exceed beneficiaries from other caste groups. Fourth, there is considerable geographic variation in program coverage, implying heterogeneity in the effectiveness of service delivery. Fifth, many of the programs have a very small impact on household welfare, even for poor households.
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seek to minimize ex ante the risks that households and groups face, and their exposure to shocks (not covered here); ii) programs which are meant to help households mitigate risks by facilitating income smoothing (Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana -JGSY, Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana -SGRY); iii) programs which promote movement out of poverty (school scholarship, school grain distribution program, Integrated Child Development Services -ICDS); and iv) programs which provide direct support to the chronically poor, without an objective of lifting households sustainably out of poverty (Targeted Public Distribution System -TPDS, National Old Age Pension -NOAP, disability pension, widow pension, and maternal benefits). This paper is organized as follows. The next section motivates the analysis undertaken by describing the poverty and vulnerability situation in UP. Thereafter, we present our assessment of three broad groups of programs. These groups of programs are: programs to mitigate risks by facilitating income smoothing (Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana -SGRY); programs to promote movement out of poverty (school scholarship program, school grain distribution program, Integrated Child Development Services -ICDS); and programs to support the chronically poor (Targeted Public Distribution System -TPDS, social assistance schemes). The ensuing section focuses on the targeting methodology used in a number of programs, namely the ration card system. A brief conclusion follows with implications for policy.
B. Poverty in Uttar Pradesh
This section outlines the poverty issues faced by UP residents and thereby sets the stage for analyzing social safety net programs and their impact. The many dimensions of poverty such as remoteness, low education, weak health, disempowerment, etc., can play an important role in determining the effectiveness of programs. Social safety net programs are by no means intended as the primary poverty reduction strategy in almost any setting, but the section provides a background to conditions in UP which are no doubt relevant for delivery of services. This paper uses per capital total household expenditures (which includes household expenditures on all goods and services and also imputed expenditures on own produce consumption) as a measure of household welfare.
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In order to capture distributional effects, all households in UP have been assigned into welfare quintiles based "preventative" measures seek to avert deprivation prospectively; and "protective" measures provide relief against deprivation ex post to the extent that the other two sets of measures fail to do so. 5 This welfare measure was created by the Government of UP and is documented in their PSMS II Report.
on the level of expenditure within urban and rural areas separately. 6 In other words, we only use measures of "relative poverty" rather than "absolute poverty" in this paper.
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Economic growth has led to a reduction in poverty in UP, but the state still accounts for almost 19 percent of India's poor. 8 In nominal terms, the per capita net state domestic product has doubled from Rs. 5,066 to Rs. 10,289 between 1993-94 and 2002-03 9 . This growth has led to a reduction in poverty rates (computed using the GoI Planning Commission official methodology) from 40.9 percent in 1993/94 to 29.2 percent in 2002-03 (Table 1) . 10 Poverty rates declined in rural areas, in the same time period, from 43.3 to 28.5 (-4.3 percent per annum), while in urban areas the decline was more modest, going from 35.4 to 32.3 percent (-1.0 percent per annum). These decreases in poverty rates are slower than those seen in the rest of India.
11 However, the fall in poverty rates in UP have led to 10.5 million fewer people being classified as poor (59.3 million in 1993/94 to 48.8 million in 2002-03) . These findings reveal that economic growth in UP between 1993-94 and 2002-03 was in fact pro-poor, and was especially beneficial to rural residents. Source: PSMS II Report using NSS 1993-94 and NSS 2002-03. Overall welfare inequality in UP is low and has decreased, but substantial welfare inequity is seen across geography and caste groups. Overall inequality, as measured by the Gini in monthly per capita expenditures across households, in UP was 0.282 in 2002-03, down from 0.305 in 1999-00. The low Gini indicates that UP has an egalitarian welfare distribution, and in fact slightly more egalitarian than the all-India Gini. 12 Nevertheless, this decrease in the Gini coefficient is consistent with the finding that per capita household expenditures increased by 109 percent and 62 percent in nominal terms for the poorest and richest deciles respectively. Using per capita household expenditures as a measure of long- 6 Welfare quintiles are assigned in rural and urban areas separately to account for the difference in price levels across the regions. Within a region, households are ranked from the poorest (lowest per-capita consumption) to the wealthiest (highest pre-capita consumption), and divided into five groups each containing a fifth of the total population. The cut-off points (i.e., the max for which a household remains in a particular quintile) of monthly per capita total household expenditures in rural areas for the quintiles 1 though 4 are: Rs. 317, 387, 457, and 577. In urban areas the cut-off points for quintiles 1 though 4 are: Rs. 398, 503, 651, and 926. As a reference, the official poverty lines reported in PSMS II Report are Rs. 346 and Rs. 460 for rural and urban areas respectively. 7 Note that World Bank (2002c) also uses relative poverty in their baseline report for the Poverty and Social Monitoring System baseline report. 8 UP's population of 170 million represents about 16 percent of India's total population. 9 GoUP, PSMS II Report. 10 Poverty rates for UP are from GoUP, PSMS II Report. 11 The decrease in UP's poverty rate from 40.9 to 29.2 percent between 1993-94 and 2002-03 is a -3.68 per annum growth. But the all-India poverty rate fell from 36 to 26.1 between 1993-94 and 1999-00, which is a growth rate of -5.22 percent per annum (MoF, 2005) . 12 The all-India rural and urban Gini coefficients for 1999-2000 were 0.258 and 0.341 respectively (Planning Commission, 2002b) . These levels of inequality are relatively low by global standards. term household welfare, generalized Lorenz curves are estimated to rank social welfare across socio-economic groups (Figure 1) . 13 The least urbanized Eastern region, with 60 million people, is the poorest in the state (top-left). The least populated Southern region (8 million people), is the richest. No clear welfare ranking can be made between the 65 million people in the Western region and the 30 million people in the Central region. Rural areas are considerably poorer than urban areas (top-right). Finally, the household welfare rankings across castes confirm that Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) (25 percent of the population) are poorer than Other Backward Castes (OBCs) (50 percent), and OBCs are in turn considerably poorer than non-backward castes. 
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A Lorenz curve is a graph of the cumulative of variable X (in our case per capita total household expenditures) against the cumulative population. The 45 o line between 0 and 1 would then represent the line of complete equality, i.e., X is the same for all. The generalized Lorenz curve is the cumulative of X divided by the population size against the cumulative population size.
In UP, poor health is one of the leading reasons for volatility in household welfare, while households cope with volatility by selling off assets such as jewelry. Although the NSS is not ideally suited to characterize types of volatility faced by households in UP, it does offer an opportunity to identify households that sold specific assets to cope with income volatility. However, it should be noted that households do not always cope with volatility by selling assets, but may also cope with volatility by, for example, withdrawing children from school, borrowing from family/lenders, getting a second job, etc., which would not be caught in this definition. Five percent of all households in UP sold or mortgaged some assets to meet emergency expenses or to repay loans in the two years preceding the survey. Of those households that sold or mortgaged assets to meet emergency expenses, more than 40 percent did so because of an illness in the family and more than a quarter of all families did so due to a marriage or death in the household (Figure 2 ). Other studies have found that households cope with volatility with a disproportionate burden on women and children in the family. When there is a need for asset liquidation, goods used by women, such as jewelry and housing utensils, are among the first to be traded. In UP too, we find that households often sell jewelry during downturns to meet immediate consumption needs. The NSS data shows that 86 percent of UP households meet emergency expenses by selling jewelry (40 percent), land/house (28 percent) and livestock (18 percent). Source: Author's calculations using NSS 2002-03.
C. Assessment of Social Safety Net Programs
The Government of India has a long history of implementing a wide array of social safety net programs to improve the welfare of poor people through redistribution or risk mitigation. Many of the programs are the responsibility of both the Central government and the State government although funding (generally around three-fourths) is largely from the Center. This section analyzes a number of social safety net programs for targeting effectiveness and household welfare improvement. Our findings across the programs considered here are (Table 2): 22 See Holzmann and Jørgensen (2000) . The pillars of SRM can also be compared to terminology widely used in India. The most commonly used concepts are of "promotional" and "protective" effects on livelihoods, and stem from Dreze and Sen (1989) . Guhan (1994) adds a third concept, "preventative". While often blurred in practice, these terms have distinct features: "promotional" measures aim to improve incomes, both in the short to medium term (through livelihood interventions) and in the longer run (through human capital interventions); "preventative" measures seek to avert deprivation prospectively; and "protective" measures provide relief against deprivation ex post to the extent that the other two sets of measures fail to do so.
• Many of the social safety net programs implemented in UP have very low coverage rates, which in turn implies that exclusion errors are very large. The social assistance programs are case in point, with less than 1 percent of the population benefiting from any of the programs. Even the targeted public distribution system only benefits about 15 percent of Below Poverty Line (BPL) cardholders. The exceptions to the low coverage pattern are the school grain distribution program (47 percent) and the school scholarship program (27 percent).
• The beneficiaries are disproportionately from poor households. Six of the programs for which sufficient data are available show that the proportion of beneficiaries from the poorest 40 percent of the welfare distribution is higher than the proportion from the top two quintiles.
• Non-poor households are benefiting from the program -inclusion errors are large. In the case of the TPDS, old age pension scheme and school grain distribution programs, 40 percent of program beneficiaries are from the bottom 40 percent of the welfare distribution.
• Program beneficiaries from SC/ST households exceed beneficiaries from other caste groups. The proportion of SC/ST participation in programs to the total program participation rate varies from 122 percent for the ICDS and school grain distribution programs to 223 percent in the case of the school scholarship program. The higher incidence of program coverage among SC/ST is partly explained by the deliberate targeting by some programs, but also since many SC/STs have characteristics, such as low asset ownership and high incidence of poverty, that increase their chances of program participation.
• There is considerable geographic variation in program coverage, implying heterogeneity in the effectiveness of service delivery. These geographic disparities in the delivery of social safety net programs are especially large for the public works schemes and for the targeted public distribution systems. Even among programs with the least geographic variation in coverage rates, such as the ICDS and school scholarship programs, the disparity between the highest and lowest incidence rates are about 140 percent.
• Many of the programs have a very small impact on household welfare, even for poor households. The programs with wide coverage, like the school scholarship and grain distribution programs, increase household welfare of a hypothetical household in the 20 th percentile by less than 1.3 percent because of the low value of the transfer. The public works schemes (SGRY) have a small impact on household welfare primarily because participants in the program have only received wages for a few days of the year in practice. On the other hand, the social assistance programs tend to offer larger transfers to beneficiaries (around 12 percent of household welfare of a hypothetical household in the 20 th percentile for old age pensions, disability benefits and widow pensions) but as mentioned earlier, coverage rates are exceedingly small. Coverage rates are the number of benefit recipients as a proportion of differing populations. These populations are: for the TPDS it is the number of BPL card holders who purchased grain from the fair price shops in the 30 days preceding the survey; for the old age pension, disability allowance, widow pension and maternal benefits it is all households; for the school scholarship and grain distribution programs it is the number of children between 5 and 18 years of age receiving the benefit; for the ICDS it is the proportion of children between the ages of 0 and 6; and for SGRY it is the proportion of all households.
(a) Programs to ex ante mitigate risks
Included among programs (and policies) to ex ante mitigate risks are those that range from responsible macroeconomic policies to programs which minimize the negative impacts of natural calamities. Although this is an important area, an analysis of these programs would be beyond the scope of this paper.
(b) Programs to mitigate risks by facilitating income smoothing
Programs designed to mitigate risks faced by households by facilitating income smoothing could include programs that address events such as lean season unemployment or health shocks, or across the life cycle. In this paper we focus on the Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana (JGSY) and Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGRY) programs.
(i) Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGRY)
The SGRY was designed and implemented with the broad objective of providing supplementary wage employment and improve community infrastructure in rural areas. 24 The SGRY is the largest rural works program in the world, in terms of person days of employment. 25 The SGRY is self-targeted, with the wage rate determining the level of participation by households of varying welfare. However, preference is given to women, SC/STs and the disabled. Wages are paid in cash and with grain, where the cash component is shared between the center and the state in the ratio of 75:25; while the food component is entirely borne by the center. The wage rate is required to be at least the minimum wage of the state, with no disparity in wage rates across gender. In September 2005, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) was passed, which essentially guarantees at least 100 days of paid work per year to every volunteer. 26 Thus, although the NREGA replaces the previous versions of public works schemes, there is an urgent need to learn many of the lessons from past incarnations of public works schemes to inform ongoing implementation of the new Act.
Past evaluations of public works programs implemented in India have shown some interesting patterns. 27 The Ministry of Rural Development in their evaluation of public works schemes across different states has highlighted the following issues: 28 a. female participation was very low, less than a fifth of all laborers were women; b. wages paid out to workers deferred from the eligible wage rate, namely the stipulated minimum wage of about Rs. 60 per person per day; c. far less than the intended 100 days of employment were generated; and d. contractors were used instead of local surplus labor, which also implies that less that Rs. 60 was received by workers.
The Planning Commission's evaluation of public works across several states revealed similar findings. 29 A subset of the findings are: a. guidelines were not followed in the identification of potential workers and of projects; b. fund utilization was low (and hence days of work generated were low), primarily because of inefficient planning, uncertainty regarding fund release, and the difficulty faced by states to match Central funds; c. muster rolls were doctored so that it appears that local authorities were complying with the requirements of the program, while in fact labor displacing machinery were employed, migrant labor was used, contractors were hired, etc.; d. low coverage, with less than a third of villages and less than 5 percent of the target group covered in a given year; and e. the grain component of wages were often not transferred, with cases of grain being recycled into the PDS system.
The remainder of this section documents the main findings of an assessment of the SGRY program in Uttar Pradesh. The analysis relies heavily on the NSS data, while references are also made to data from the Ministry of Rural Development on physical and financial performance of the SGRY program.
A very small proportion of households in Uttar Pradesh has access and avail themselves of public works programs. 1.3 percent of all households and 1.6 percent of rural households, have at least one member of the household benefiting from public works programs. Less than 6 households are beneficiaries of public works schemes per 100 BPL cardholders in the state. Administrative data suggests that of the Rs. 5 billion in available funds for public works schemes, only about 57 percent are actually utilized. 30 As a result, there appears to be scope for scale up of the program, which the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) attempts to achieve. However, we describe below the discrepancies between the government figures and those estimated using household surveys.
The proportion of households receiving benefits from public works programs varies with socioeconomic characteristics. Our findings on incidence of public works programs in UP are as follows:
• Participation in public works schemes is not strictly progressive across welfare quintiles, but a higher proportion of poor households are benefiting from the scheme than non-poor households (Figure 3 ). Across household welfare quintiles, almost 2 percent of the poorest households have at least one beneficiary of public works, while only 0.7 percent of the richest households have at least one beneficiary.
• Public works coverage is higher in the poorest Eastern region and the Central region. Of all households, 1.9 and 1.6 percent of households in the Eastern and Central regions are benefiting from public works schemes. While only 0.5 and 0.7 percent of all households in the Western and Southern (richest) regions receive any benefits from public works. Per BPL cardholder too the geographic disparities remain broadly similar, with a larger fraction of households in the Eastern and Central region benefiting from public works schemes (around 6.3 percent of all BPL cardholders), while in the Southern region only 2.6 percent of all BPL cardholders benefit from public works schemes. On the other hand, the Western region's relatively smaller fraction of BPL cardholders leads to a higher proportion of BPL cardholders benefiting from public works.
• SC/STs and OBC are well represented. The NSS 2004-05 reveals that almost 200,000 and 143,000 households benefiting from public works schemes are SC/ST and OBC, respectively. These two groups make up about more than 95 percent of all public works beneficiaries, while these groups only make up 75 percent of all households in UP. This may reflect the emphasis public works programs place on ensuring that the SC/ST population is especially targeted by the programs. Thus, 2.7 percent of SC/ST households have at least one beneficiary. Across other backward castes and across non-backward castes 1 percent and 0.2 percent of households have at least one public works beneficiary. 
The realized number of days of paid work by households is less than a 10
th of the 100 days of employment that the program is intended to provide to households. SGRY schemes were intended to offer a maximum of 100 days of work to at most two members of the households. However, among households with at least one public works beneficiary, the median number of days of work by males was 8 days. In addition the 30 percent of the employment opportunities generated are intended for women, 31 but according to the NSS 2002-03 data, the number of women benefiting from the program is very marginal. And, females worked less than a day in the preceding year. Comparing the SGRY work days generated across the 20 states for which data are available, UP ranks around the middle, even though it is one of the poorest states.
Among the few beneficiaries of public works schemes, there is variation in the number of days of work. The median number of days of work in public works programs ranged from 4 days in the Western region to 15 in the Southern region. Across household welfare quintiles, the median number of days of public works was 8 days of the year for quintiles 1, 2 and 3, but a high of 12 for those in quintile 4. Finally, there was little variation in the median number of days of work between non-backward castes, SC/STs and OBCs. The wages received by public works participants are actually far lower than the stipulated Rs. 60 per day. The median for the sample of public works beneficiaries is Rs. 40. However, there is very large variation in the wage rates across the sample of public works participants, with about 85 percent of the sample receiving a wage below the stipulated wage of Rs. 60 per day.
32 However, to estimate the impact of the public works program on household welfare, when in fact households receive the full allocation of wages, we would assume that current participants in the program receive Rs. 60 per day of work as stipulated and we assume that on average 10 days are worked each year. Therefore, the Rs. 600 per year amounts to around 2.5 percent of total household expenditures per annum.
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There is also a significant disparity in performance indicators across administrative data and the NSS household data. Administrative data suggests that 31.3 million mandays of work were generated in 2001-02, while the NSS data for 2002-03 suggests that less the 3 million man-days were generated. 34 Although the data sources are from two different years, the disparity is remarkably large. Planning Commission (2002a) suggests that part of the discrepancy is due to the fictitious muster rolls created at the local level to justify receipt 32 Part of the payment to workers can be in the form of grain, but too few observations in the NSS data for UP precludes an analysis of this variable. 33 If we also assume that the full allocation of days of work, namely 100 days, then the impact on household welfare is likely to be much larger. However, a simulation predicting 100 days of work in the public works scheme because more complicated because households are also likely to alter their own behavior, possibly by changing the number of days in the labor market or the number of days of paid work by children in the households. 34 Ministry of Rural Development (2003) .
of Central and State funds for SGRY projects. However, more evidence is needed to get to the true reason.
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Low participation in SGRY within UP is consistent with findings across states in India, where UP is a low spender of central allocations to public works. For instance, the funds utilized as a fraction of funds allocated by GoI is about 44 percent but the fraction of food grain utilized as a fraction of food grain allocated is less than 20 percent (one of the lowest among Indian states). Programs to promote movement out of poverty Among programs designed to promote the movement of households out of poverty, we include programs that increase investments in human capital, or promote sustainable above-subsistence livelihoods. Specific programs that can be categorized into this group include the school scholarship, school grain distribution program, Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), and Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY). For the purposes of this paper, we limit our analysis to the first three programs.
(i) School Scholarship Program
The school scholarship program is intended to boost enrollment, attendance and retention in school. When the program was initiated, the intended beneficiaries were all SC/ST children and up to three children per school who were from OBCs and who were below the poverty line. But, since mid-2004, the program was broadened to include all
OBCs. 36 The beneficiary students are eligible to receive Rs. 300 per year if they maintain 80 percent attendance. There is a large gap in evaluation studies of this program, as a result, below are the main findings of the analysis using the NSS data.
The NSS indicates that more than a quarter (27 percent) of all students in UP's government schools received a scholarship to attend school and there is no apparent inequity between boys and girls. No gender variation in scholarship incidence for attendance in schools, with the 27.2 percent of boys and 27.4 percent of girls receiving scholarships. However, because boys form a significantly larger proportion of students (56 percent) in government schools, more boys receive scholarships than do girls.
The school scholarship program is progressive and does reach a higher proportion of SC/ST children relative to other caste groups. Poor households are more likely to receive the scholarship than rich households in both rural and urban areas. The proportion of households receiving the scholarship declines with increasing household welfare ( Figure  5 ) 37 . Among the poorest quintile, 36 percent of students receive the scholarship, while for the richest households the proportion falls to less than 17 percent. SC/ST pupils are benefiting from the program. More than 60 percent of all SC/STs currently attending government schools are receiving a scholarship, while only 13.1 percent of other backward casts and less than 10 percent of non-backward casts receive the scholarships. There is considerable geographic variation in the proportion of scholarship recipients. The proportion of scholarship recipients is significantly larger in rural areas, where almost 29 percent of all government school pupils are recipients while in urban areas only 16 percent are recipients. Across regions too there is variation in the proportion of scholarship recipients, ranging from a low of 25 percent in the Eastern and Western regions to a high of about 35 percent in the Central and Southern regions of UP.
Considering that all SC/STs are entitled to the scholarship, significant improvement in coverage will be needed if the remaining 40 percent of enrolled SC/STs, around 2 million pupils, are to be included in the scholarship program. In addition, inclusion errors are also a problem, with almost 10 percent of pupils from non-backward castes, around 0.4 million, receiving the stipend. The official program allocation of Rs. 300 per child and the amount reported by households is consistent, but the transfer has only a small impact on household welfare. Among students who report having received the scholarship over the past 12 months, the less than 8 percent reported receiving less than Rs. 300 for the year in scholarships. Among households that received the scholarship, the ratio of the monthly scholarship received by children to the total per capita expenditures of households at the 20 th percentile is about 1.34 percent. In other words, the overall impact of the transfer is small relative to household welfare levels. However, the real impact to households can be argued is the increase in human capital that children get from attending school.
The determinants of receiving a scholarship to attend school reveal the impact of a particular characteristics holding all else constant. A probit model of the determinants of school scholarships is estimated holding gender, religion, caste, region, household welfare quintile, household head's education attainment, and household head's sex. Separate models are estimated for urban, rural and urban and rural together. However, there appears to be no substantive differences across the sectors. The following factors are significant determinants of school scholarships in UP, holding other factors constant::
• Caste matters -The targeted groups, namely SC/STs and OBCs are 56 and 6 percent more likely to receive a scholarship than pupils from non-backward castes.
• Geographic variation is evident -Residents of the Eastern and Western regions of UP are 19 and 14 percent less likely to receive a scholarship than those pupils in the Southern region of UP.
• Gender matters -Statistically, girls are less likely to receive school scholarships, but the magnitude of the impact is very small (2 percent).
• The scholarship is progressive -The probability of participation declines with increasing household welfare. Like with the gender coefficient, the magnitude of the impact is small. When a discrete variable is used (not shown) to capture the wealth of households too, the program appears progressive. That is, poorer households (those in quintiles 1, 2 and 3) are significantly more likely to receive a scholarship than the richest quintile of households. For example, households in quintile 1 are 7 percent more likely to receive a scholarship than those households in quintile 5.
• Higher parental education reduces the chances of receiving a scholarshipChildren in households with a household head between 1 and 5 years of education are not more likely than children in households with household heads with no education to receive a scholarship.
• Household size matters -larger households are less likely to receive a scholarship than smaller households, but the magnitude of the impact is small.
• Religion matters -Muslims are 32 percent more likely to receive a scholarship than Hindu pupils. Note: *** -significant at 1% level; ** -significant at 5% level; * -significant at 10% level.
The sample is restricted to individuals between the ages of 5 and 15. Reference variables are: boys, Hindus, non-backward castes, the southern region, less than 1 year of education, and female head of household.
(ii) School Grain Distribution Program
The school grain distribution program was implemented in an effort to improve the children's nutritional status and to improve attendance in school. Under the National Program for Nutritional Support to Primary Education (NPNSPE) launched in 1995, children in Class I-V in government primary schools, primary schools aided by government and primary schools run by local bodies were to be provided a cooked meal. The program came to be known as the mid-day meal program. However, due to capacity constraints, many State governments, including GoUP, chose not to implement the MDM and instead distributed grain rations to children who attended school.
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The Centrally Sponsored Scheme is implemented by the Department of Education through Panchayats and Nagarpalikas, with the Center absorbing the cost of the grain and some transportation costs. The program was in place unit mid-2004, when it was phased out in place of providing a cooked meal to children under the mid-day meal scheme. 40 Under the program, children with at least 80 percent attendance in the last month are entitled to receive either 3 kg of rice or 3 kg of wheat each month. h. poor quality of the food has led to a high incidence of illness reported among students consuming the MDM, with 10 percent of parents reporting at least one day of illness due to the meal; 48 and i. the Mid-Day meal preparation can be disruptive, especially in schools with weak infrastructure, but afternoon attendance is higher than in schools that send the children home for lunch.
Evaluations of the grain distribution and cooked meal distribution
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Our findings on the school grain distribution program are detailed in the remainder of this section. Much of the information is contained in the NSS data, although some references are made to information from the Ministry of Education.
Coverage rates for the school grain distribution program in UP are relatively high. Almost a half of all children between the ages of 5 and 18, who are currently enrolled in school, received some grain during the 30 days prior to the survey. Among children currently attending school, 39 percent received wheat, and 31 percent received rice. Conversely, exclusion errors are around 50 percent. The proportion of recipients increases to 56 percent when child enrolled in grades 6 through 12 are considered. However, even when this age group is considered, more than 40 percent of children who are already enrolled in school are not receiving benefits, implying that exclusion errors are significant.
Among those pupils who received grain, almost all reported receiving 3 kg of rice or 3 kg of wheat. Among children who received any grain from schools, we find that more than 80 percent of children received either 3 kg of rice or 3 kg of wheat. The implication being that the allocated 3 kg by government are actually reaching pupils, without any "leakage."
Rural areas appear to benefit from the grain distribution program, but there is also variation in program coverage across geographical regions of UP. Grain rations are mostly provided to children in rural areas, where 51 percent of all children receive either wheat or rice. In urban areas 29 percent of all children receive any grain from school. Significant variation is seen across UP both in the type of grain distributed and the proportion of children receiving the benefit. The proportion of children receiving either wheat or rice from school varies from a high of 63 percent in the Southern region to a low of 40 percent in the Western region. Children in the Eastern region are most likely to receive rice, while children in the Southern region are more likely to receive wheat.
The grain program does impact a higher proportion of SC/STs, but benefits are not strongly progressive. SC/ST children benefit considerably more from the grain distribution program than other caste groups. Almost 57 percent of SC/ST, 44 percent of OBC, and 43 percent of non-backward caste children currently attending school receive some grain. Across household welfare quintiles, poorer households are almost as likely to receive some grain as non-poor households in UP. Almost 49 percent of children from the poorest 40 percent of the welfare distribution receive some grain from school, while 47
47 See Dreze and Goyal (2003) . 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid.
percent of children from the richest 40 percent of the welfare distribution receive any grain from the school. Despite the relatively high coverage, a concerted effort will be required to include all government schools in the program. In 2005-06, UP lifted a little more than 60 percent of the allotted for the school-grain distribution program. As a result, without a significant increase in expenditures, the school-grain distribution program can be scaled up to include schools not currently covered. 
(iii) Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS)
The Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) is the largest community-based outreach system for women and children in the world (Editorial, Indian Journal of Community Medicine, 2003) and is the main nutrition programs implemented in UP. The ICDS, managed by the Department of Women and Child Development, has the following goals: (i) improve the nutritional and health status of pregnant women, nursing mothers, and children 0-6 years 50 ; (ii) improve the psychological, physical and social development of children; (iii) reduce the incidence of mortality, morbidity, malnutrition and school dropouts; (iv) promote child development through the improved coordination across departments; and (v) improve the ability of mothers to address the health and nutritional needs of their children (World Bank, 2001 ). The typical package offered by Anganwadi workers includes: supplementary nutrition, immunization, health check-up, referral services, treatment of minor illnesses, nutrition and health education to women, pre-school education to children in the age group of 3-6 years (Kapil, 2002) .
Past studies have found some interesting patterns in the design and implementation of the ICDS program in India. A summary of findings from other studies are as follows: a. targeting: low coverage in particularly vulnerable areas, low incidence of children below the age of 3, and girls, very poor and lower caste children are not preferentially targeted; 51 b. focus: the focus on food supplementation has led to decreased emphasis on important educational aspects such as good childcare behavior and feeding practices; 52 and c. training: insufficient training to anganwadi workers has led to, among other things, inadequate knowledge about pregnant/lactating women's nutritional needs; and d. insufficient community involvement.
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The prevalence of underweight children in UP is among the highest in the country, with 52 percent of all children under 3 being underweight. 54 The consequences of under-nourishment go beyond retardation of physical development to generally limiting the learning and cognitive process. With these far reaching consequences of nutrition, ICDS centers, also known as Anganwadi centers, were designed to address the multidimensional causes of malnutrition. In the remainder of this section, we detail some of the main findings from on the ICDS scheme using NSS data. We begin with a discussion of the availability of centers and then move into a discussion of the usage of the centers by households in UP.
Access to Anganwadi centers is a problem, especially in the Western region.
Only 37 percent of households with a 0 to 6 year old reported that an Anganwadi center existed in their village or block. Almost 45 percent of households reported that no Anganwadi center was available and 18 percent reported that they were unsure if such a facility was available in the village/block.
• Access rates are higher in rural areas. In rural and urban areas 43 and 10 percent respectively of households report that an Anganwadi center is available in the village or block. Conversely, almost 60 percent of rural residents reveal that no Anganwadi center is available in their village of residence.
• Across UP, the least access to Anganwadi centers is reported in the Western region (22 percent) and the highest in the Southern region (55 percent).
• However, access is higher than average among SC/STs (43 percent) and OBCs (37 percent) relative to non-backward castes (31 percent).
Anganwadi centers are more prevalent in richer areas relative to poorer areas of UP.
Households in quintiles 4 report the highest access rates to Anganwadi centers (41 percent) while households in quintile 1 report the lowest access rates (34 percent). In addition, the highest proportion of households that were unaware of whether or not an Anganwadi center was available in their village/block was reported by households in the poorest 20 percent of the welfare distribution. ICDS coverage in UP is very low even though one in two children in the target age group in the state was underweight in 1998-99. 55 Less than 10 percent of all children between 0 and 6 years of age attended an Anganwadi center during the time of the survey 56 . However, current rates of attendance in Anganwadi centers are considerably higher than rates during 1999-00, when less than 0.5 percent of children attended the centers. 57 The proportion of girls attending Anganwadi centers (9.8 percent) was very marginally higher than the proportion of boys attending the centers (9.2 percent). Rural residents were almost twice as likely to use these centers -9.8 and 4.9 percent of rural and urban children respectively attended the centers. Across UP too there was some variation, with the highest proportion of attendance in the Southern region (12.1 percent) and the lowest proportion of attendance in the Eastern region (8.7 percent).
Poor and SC/ST households are more likely to use Anganwadi centers than others.
• Anganwadi center attendance is progressive -meaning that attendance is higher among the poor than among the rich. Almost 11 percent of children from the poorest 40 percent of the household welfare distribution attend Anganwadi centers. However, children from the richest 40 percent of the welfare distribution around 7.5 percent attend.
• SC/STs were more likely to attend than other castes. The proportion of SC/STs attending Anganwadi centers (11.6 percent) is higher than the attendance rate for OBCs (8.9 percent) and non-backward castes (8.0 percent). Gragnolati, et al. (2005) . 56 Households with at least on child between the ages of 0 and 6 report on whether or not they attend the Anganwaldi center with no time frame specified. 57 PSMS I. The ICDS program is not reaching children between the crucial ages of 0 and 3. While almost 10 percent of 0 to 6 year olds are attending Anganwadi centers, less than 6 percent of 0 to 3 year olds and less than 4 percent of 0 to 2 year olds are attending these centers. There is substantial evidence that the optimal window for intervening and ensuring good nutritional outcomes is when children are between 0 and 3 years old. As a result, Anganwadi center use in UP would likely have only a small impact on malnutrition rates. There are three main reasons why ICDS centers are not attracting 0 to 3 year olds. First, 0-3 year olds are more difficult to transport to Anganwadi centers than 4-6 year olds. Second, 4-6 year olds also benefit from attending pre-school at these centers, hence providing an added reason to attend. Third, the anganwadi centers are less equipped for the younger cohorts (many centers do not have proper weaning foods) and hence, mothers may not see a great benefit in attending a center.
Although only a small percentage of households used the Anganwadi centers, the services offered were thought to be of value by households that did use the centers.
• Were the Anganwadi centers open for children and parents to attend? More than half the households that attended Anganwadi centers reported that centers were open for more than 24 days in the 30 days preceding the survey.
• Were the centers perceived to be worth attending regularly? Among households that attended an Anganwadi centers at least once, more than half the households attended the centers for more than 20 days during the previous 30 days. This utilization by households suggests that there was value in the program in their region.
• Were supplies available at these facilities to distribute to children? Assuming that the number of days of food supplementation is an appropriate measure of availability of supplies, more than half of all households using centers received more than 20 days of food supplementation. The conclusion is that households that utilized the service did so because centers were open, the services provided were useful and because food supplementation was available during their visits. Source: Author's calculations using NSS 2002-03.
(d) Programs to support the chronically poor
In this section, we focus on programs which provide direct support to the chronically poor without necessarily lifting households sustainably out of poverty. The programs help to mitigate the severity of current poverty in a way that avoids behaviour that will perpetuate poverty in the longer run (such as withdrawal of children from school, or providing inadequate nutrition to infants). In this section we focus on the following programs: Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) and Social assistance schemes (National Old Age Pension, Disability pension, Widow pension, and Maternal benefits).
(i) Targeted Public Distribution System
The Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) is the largest food security program in India, accounting for about 1 percent of GDP. The TPDS came into effect in June 1997, when the old PDS was replaced in favor of a targeted, rather than a universal, program for poor people. The central government alone spent around Rs. 241 billion, which is 5 percent of GoI expenditures in 2002-03 on TPDS. The main objectives of the TPDS are: i) maintain price stability; ii) improve the welfare of the poor; and iii) manage reserves in times of scarcity. The above objectives are addressed through the provision of rice, wheat, edible oils, and kerosene at below market price.
The TPDS has undergone several transformations over the decades, but in its current incarnation it provides subsidized "essential" goods to targeted households. Under this program, ration cards are issued to Below Poverty Line (BPL), Above Poverty Line (APL) and Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) households. Today, BPL cardholders are entitled to 35 kg per month per family at the equivalent of about 50 percent of economic costs and APL households are entitled to 10 kg per month per family at the equivalent of about 70 percent of economic costs. Antyodaya households, the poorest households, can purchase up to 35 kg a month at around 25 percent of economic costs.
Several evaluations of the TPDS program exist.
The Planning Commission's evaluation of TPDS, a particularly comprehensive and recent evaluation, found the following factors to be particularly relevant to the program's effectiveness: 58 a. The price differential between the market price and the fair price shop price is small, limiting the attractiveness of fair price shops for household supplies. b. Low grain quality at fair price shops -half of all BPL card holders in the sample of households interviewed reported that foreign particles are substantially present in the grain. c. Households were generally not given the opportunity to purchase the grain in installments, and instead had to make a lump sum purchase. d. 85 percent of households in UP reported that local grain varieties are preferred to those available at fair price shops.
An empirical evaluation of effectiveness of targeting, supply and institutions in the shift from the old PDS to the TPDS for the state of UP found the following: 59 a. The goals of bureaucrats were not aligned with the goals of the TPDS. Bureaucrats were more focused on using the TPDS as a means of maintaining grain price stability, than providing a safety net for the poor. b. Irregular supply of grain to fair price shops, but also noted difficulties. c. Grain supplies were getting lost, with some instances of sale from the block godown to the open market, bypassing the fair price shops. d. Fair price shop keepers were inflating prices of grain to improve their profitability, but the profitability of these shops was also found to be quite low. e. Low quality food grains were sold in fair price shops. f. The infrastructure surrounding the TPDS was found to be very elaborate and hence imposed high coordination costs, weak accountability mechanisms, insufficient supervision, and insufficient transparency.
Despite the comprehensive and in-depth findings listed in other studies on the functioning of the TPDS in India, there is considerably less recent information available on the functioning of the TPDS in UP. The remainder of this section attempts to update the knowledgebase by using the NSS 2002-02 with a specific focus on UP.
Fair price shops remain an important source of food grain to Antyodya households, but less so for BPL cardholders. Only a seventh of all BPL cardholders purchased food grain from a fair price shop in the 30 days preceding the survey (Figure 7) . 60 The utilization rate increases to a third for those households with an Antyodaya card. Interestingly, the proportion of BPL cardholders purchasing wheat and/or rice in urban areas exceeds the proportion of households in rural areas doing the same in the 30 days preceding the survey. . 59 Kriesel and Zaidi (1999) used the 1997-98 UP-Bihar Survey of Living Conditions (SLC) to conduct their quantitative analysis. 60 About 4 percent of ALL households in UP purchased either rice or wheat from a fair price shop 30 days prior to the survey. 61 Historically, one of the key objectives of the PDS system was to purchase surplus grain from farmers in rural areas and sell the grain in urban areas, especially at times when urban areas faced rising prices. However, recent trends have led private traders to play a bigger role in urban areas than in the past, and in turn the fair price Among Antyodaya card members too, the proportion of urban households purchasing rice exceeds that of rural households, but the proportion of rural Antyodaya households that purchased wheat (36 percent) is almost double that of urban Antyodaya households (17 percent). These low utilization rates for BPL allocations and relatively higher utilization rates for AAY households are consistent with findings from other states. GoI allocates grain to states based on the number of people holding BPL, APL, and AAY cards, and also the state's off take of those items in previous years. Once these allocations are made, fair price shops sell the goods to households at varying prices, which are dependant on the type of card held by the household. UP's off-take as a proportion of allotment is only 41 percent of BPL allocations and almost 97 percent for Antyodaya allocations (GoI for 2002-03). The off-take ratios for India as a whole are 60 percent for BPL allocations and 86 percent of AAY allocations. For APL allocations, the off-take ratio of grain is less than 1 percent in UP, while in India as a whole the ratio is above 6 percent 62 .
One of the mains reasons for the low off-take among BPL and APL households in UP is that even when quality differences between open market and fair price shop grain is minimal, the cost saving from the latter is small. In fact, for both rice and wheat, UP has the smallest price difference between market and BPL prices across 18 states sampled in GoI (2005) . However, for AAY households the price difference is significant enough to encourage higher fair price shop utilization for grain, especially since households that possess an AAY card are among the poorest in the country. Among Indian states, the grain off-take ratios place UP in the lowest third for BPL and APL allocations, but among the top third for Antyodaya off-take.
shop became more prevalent in rural areas to reach economically and socially backward areas and vulnerable regions under the Revamped PDS in 1992 and then to reach poor through the TPDS (GoI, 2000) . 62 In the past, the disparity in prices between fair price shops and market prices for sugar was quite substantial, but that difference too has waned in recent times, which give APL households smaller incentive to continue to frequent the fair price shops.
Fair price shops are waning in importance for household's food grain needs. NSS 55 revealed that 11 percent of all households and 27 percent of BPL cardholders purchased rice and/or wheat from a fair price shop in the 30 days preceding that survey. 63 With current utilization rates at 4.5 and 16.2 percent respectively, there is a clear drop in the TPDS usage for food grain. This drop in importance is also seen for sugar. While 63 percent of BPL cardholders purchased sugar from a fair price shop in the 30 days preceding the NSS 55 survey, only 8 percent did so during the NSS 58 survey.
The following findings summarize the large variation in fair price shop usage seen across socioeconomic characteristics (Figure 8 ):
• The proportion of SC/STs shopping at fair price shops always exceeded other castes, regardless of the type of card held by the households.
• Among BPL cardholders, SC/STs were the most likely to purchase food grain from a fair price shop. The proportion of households purchasing rice and/or wheat in the last 30 days was around 17, 13, or 11 percent depending on whether the household is an SC/ST, OBC or non-backward caste.
• Among Antyodaya households, SC/STs and OBC were more likely to purchase wheat, while non-backward castes were more likely to purchase rice. Almost 40 percent of all SC/STs and non-backward castes with an Antyodaya card purchased wheat in the 30 days preceding the survey, while only 25 percent of all OBC households did the same. On the other hand, about 11 percent of SC/STs and OBCs with Antyodaya cards purchased rice in the 30 days preceding the survey, almost 25 percent of non-backward casts did the same.
• Large variation in fair price shop usage for grain is also evident across geographic regions. In the Southern region, 36 percent of BPL cardholders purchased grain from a fair price shop in the 30 days preceding the survey, but only 10 percent of BPL cardholders in the Central region did the same. Among AAY households too there is large variation across geographic regions, with two-thirds of AAY households in the Western region purchasing grain from fair price shop and less than 4 percent of AAY households in the Central region doing the same.
• Despite generally low coverage rates, inclusion errors are significant in the utilization of fair price shops for the household's rice and wheat. Among BPL cardholders, around 23 percent of households from the bottom 40 percent of the welfare distribution purchase grain from fair price shops regularly, while for the richest 40 percent of the welfare distribution, the proportion using fair price shops drops to around 15 percent. The low off-take of grain by households in UP is also corroborated by state-level analyses. The state of UP's off-take of grain from the Food Corporation of India (FCI) corresponds to 285 kg per BPL family per annum. 64 However, the off-take by households is only a third of that, namely 93 kg per BPL family per annum. The difference in these numbers indicates that two-thirds of the grain allocation to UP is not reaching the intended poor. More analysis is needed to understand the reason for the disparities, with issues such as waste, leakage of grain into the markets and to non-BPL households, etc. possibly playing a role. Fair price shops are a significant source of food grain for those households that use the store regularly. Although fewer than 5 percent of ALL households purchased food grain from fair price shops, households that purchased grain from a fair price shop purchased about Rs. 110 worth of grain from the shop each month. Variation in total expenditures on grain across socio-economic groups is small, with most households using fair price shops at all purchasing close to their full allocation. As a percent of total household expenditures, fair price shop grain expenditures represent more than 7 percent of household expenditures of a household in the 20 th percentile. Among households that purchased food grain from fair price shops, the median quantity of wheat and rice purchased in the 30 days preceding the survey was 23 and 12 kg, respectively. The median amount purchased does not vary appreciably across geographic regions, or caste. However, it is dependent on the kind of card that households hold. For instance, while the median BPL and APL household purchased about 23 kg of wheat, Antyodaya households purchased only 10 kg. As for rice purchases, the median BPL and Antyodaya households purchased around 12 kg from the fair price shop, while the median APL household purchased about 5 kg in the last month. among households in urban areas and among non-SC/ST households. In addition, shortages were reported more often in the Western region, where more than 80 percent of households report that rice and wheat were not available at the nearest fair price shop. On the other hand, in the Southern region, only 13 percent of households reported that rice or wheat was not available at the nearest fair price shop. Source: Author's calculations using NSS 2002-03.
We estimate the determinants of food grain off-take by the household using a Probit model with a 1 representing households that purchased some grain from the fair price shop in the 30 days prior to the survey and a 0 for all other households. We begin by interpreting the determinants of off-take of all households with a ration card in order of significance of the estimates coefficient (Table 13 ):
• Unsurprisingly, the most significant factor affecting food grain off-take is the type of card held by the household. Household with a BPL, Annapurna and Antyodaya card are 0.6, 9.6 and 33.4 percentage points more likely to purchase food grain from a fair price shop than households with an APL card. This is a striking result because BPL cardholders are only slightly more likely to purchase food grain from a fair price shop, compared to APL households, but Antyodaya households are considerably more likely to make the same purchase at a fair price shop.
• Geography matters -households in Eastern, Central and Western regions are significantly less likely to purchase food grain from a fair price shop.
• The probability of food grain off-take is higher with increasing household welfare, holding the type of card (APL, BPL, AAY or Annapurna) constant.
• The likelihood of food grain purchase is high when households report that food security in the house is either bad or average, relative to households that report that food security is good.
goods at the fair price shop, have an interest in the good, while those households that answered 3) did not have sufficient interest in the product to determine whether the fair price shop had it or not.
• Households with a head who has completed between 1 and 5 years of education is more likely to purchase food grain from an fair price shop than those households with a head with either more than 5 years of education or less than 1 years of formal education.
• Households with land are likely to meet food grain needs though subsistence farming. Although less statistically significant, the probability of offtake decreases with increasing land holdings. Since we are also holding household wealth constant, this result can be interpreted as the household's ability to meet their own food grain needs by cultivating their own land.
• Accessibility to fair price shops does increase grain off-take. The probability of a food grain purchase increase when households are within 0.5 km of a fair price shop relative to households that are more than 1 km away. Here too, the estimated coefficient is only significant at the 10 percent level, implying weaker statistical correlation.
• Caste does not play a role. The caste of the household does no play a role in increasing or decreasing the chances of the household using the nearest fair price shops, when all other factors are included.
Among BPL cardholders, the determinants of food grain off-take from the nearest fair price shop reveals:
• Geography matters -households in Eastern and Central regions of UP are less likely to purchase food grain from a fair price shop that households in the Southern or Western regions.
• Rural households are 14 percentage points less likely to purchase food grain from a fair price shop than households in urban areas.
• Households with a household head with between 1 and 5 years of education is more likely to purchase from a fair price shop than those households with a head with less than 1 year of education or more than 5 years of education. This coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level, so weaker correlation.
• Household welfare and food security rating are not significant determinants of grain off-take at fair price shops. Household welfare is not a significant determinant of food grain off-take, meaning that among BPL cardholders off-take is not progressive. In addition, households that believe their own food security is either bad or average are not statistically more likely to purchase grain from a fair price shop than households that rate their food security as good.
Among Antyodaya households, the determinants of food grain off-take from the nearest fair price shop reveals that none of the included socioeconomic characteristics have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of food grain off-take from fair price shops. Comparing the results from the BPL card holders and all ration card holders, this result indicates that geography is no longer a determinant of offtake, and nor is household head's education level, access to fair price shops, nor selfreported food security status. Source: Author's calculations using NSS 2002-03. Note: *** -significant at 1% level; ** -significant at 5% level; * -significant at 10% level. The sample is restricted to households that claim that food grain was available in the nearest fair price shop in the 30 days preceding the survey. The first column refers to all households that have an APL, BPL, AAY, or Annapurna card.
(ii) Social Assistance Schemes
The National Social Assistance Scheme (NSAS) was launched in August 1995 by the Department of Rural Development with three major components. First, the old age pension is provided to applicants over 65 years of age and who have limited means of support. Second, persons suffering a 60 percent disability or the death of a breadwinner in a poor household also qualifies for a National Family Benefit Scheme (NFBS). Finally, families below the poverty line are entitled to a Rs. 500 cash benefit for up to two live-birth pregnancies. The data indicates that the benefits for the old age pensions, the widow pensions and the disability pensions are all around Rs. 1,500 per year. The maternal benefits accruing to pregnant mothers are approximately Rs. 500. The National Social Assistance Scheme (NSAS) was introduced in August of 1995. The schemes are managed by the Central Ministry of Rural Development. 67 Although the scheme is 100 percent centrally sponsored, most states voluntarily supplement the benefits paid out to households. b. Coverage under the program is low. One of the key barriers to greater coverage is due to the difficulty in classifying the eligible population into the relevant subgroup. 69 The complexity in correctly identifying qualifying participants sometime acts as a barrier to entry for households, while at the other extreme it can lead to misuse. Examples of difficulties include, lack of documentation indicating the official age, especially in tribal villages, and difficulty in correctly determining a 60 percent disability. On the positive side, leakage is low. Below, is a discussion of the performance of social assistance programs in UP using the NSS data.
Exclusion errors are large in that coverage rates are very small for the four social assistance schemes listed above. In terms of overall incidence, the old age pension, the disability allowance, the widows pension, and pregnancy benefits are realized in 0.76, 0.05, 0.66 and 0.10 percent of all households in UP.
Among the social assistance programs, old age pensions do target poor people reasonably well, while the evidence is inconclusive for the other programs. In the case of widow pensions and maternal benefits, the concentration curves of the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries crosses, implying that no clear welfare ranking can be made between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.
68 Saxena (2005) . 69 Subbarao (1998) and Murgai et al (2006) . 70 This was reported in a study of Karnataka by Murgai, et al. (2006) . 71 Operations Research Group (1998). There is variation in program incidence across castes and across household welfare.
With coverage rates below 1 percent, our ability to disaggregate beneficiaries across socioeconomic characteristics is limited. In addition, it should be noted that the eligible population is not always known and as a result we are unable to make inferences about the proportion of the intended beneficiaries who benefit from the programs. This is especially true for the disabled population and pregnant population. However, if we assume that population groups, such as SC/STs, households in different quintiles, etc., have the same proportion of eligible members in the household, then we can make inferences about the distribution of beneficiaries across socioeconomic characteristics. The old age pensions, widow pensions, and pregnancy benefits accrue to a higher fraction of SC/ST households relative to other castes while the incidence of the disability allowance is marginally higher for non-backward castes. There is also variation in incidence rates across household welfare quintiles, with none of the programs showing a definitive progressive property. For instance, the highest rates of incidence are seen for households in quintile 4 for the old age pension, quintile 2 for disability and pregnancy benefits, and quintile 1 for widow pensions.
However, the above incidence rates should be interpreted with caution because of the low overall coverage. By the same token, we can conclude that inclusion errors are also large with 30 percent of all beneficiaries of disability and maternal benefits and 40 percent of old age pension and widow pension recipients from the top 40 percent of household welfare. Our estimates from NSS 2002-03 are that the old age pension benefits about 215,000 people with Rs. 500 per year. Since an over 65 year old person is present in a fifth of all households in UP, approximately 3.8 percent of all UP households with at least 1 elderly member in the household is receiving benefits from the old age pension scheme. For persons eligible for the national old age pension but not actually getting cash benefit, the Annapurna program is in place. The scheme is intended to provide 10 kg of grain per month, free of cost, to persons who are eligible.
However, benefits are leaking to non-eligible households. It does appear that a seventh of all old age pension benefits are being received by households with no resident members over the age of 65. 72 However, almost all households receiving the old age pension benefits appear to have at least one member who is at least 60 years old. It is possible that elderly persons over 60 can apply for the old age pension knowing that age verification is not possible.
The transfers constitute an important income source for the limited number of households that benefit. The old age, disability and widows pensions each make up about 12 percent of total household expenditures of a household in the 20 th percentile. Maternal benefits on the other hand, have a smaller impact on household welfare, with a ratio of benefits to household welfare of 4 percent for a household in the 20 th percentile. 
D. Targeting and the Ration Card System
Correctly identifying vulnerable groups is crucial to realizing impacts of various government interventions and ensuring that scarce resources are employed in the most efficient manner. As described above the actual targeting instrument employed vary considerably across programs. With food security programs such as the TPDS system, cards are issued to identify households based on various factors which estimate welfare deprivation; with the SGRY program, the targeting is mainly though self-targeting arrangements (targeting is achieved by setting a wage rate that would attract different segments of the population); with scholarship programs, castes are targeted; and with social assistance age based, disability based and pregnancy status are the primary determinants of eligibility along with poverty. Targeting is further complicated in that many programs use a combination of targeting instruments. For instance, while SGSY schemes are primarily meant to benefit BPL cardholders, minimum participation by ST/SCs and women are further specified.
The Government of Uttar Pradesh uses the ration card system as the primary means with which to identify the poor. In 2002-03, GoUP followed the 1997 BPL census methodology published by the Department of Rural Development to identify poor households. 73 This methodology for separating the poor from the non-poor involved two stages. First, the "visibly poor" were identified as those households in a survey that answered negative to all of the following: 74 i) whether the land operated was more than 2 hectares, ii) whether housing materials are pucca, iii) whether annual household income exceeded Rs. 20,000, iv) whether households owned any of the following: television, refrigerator, ceiling fan, motor cycle or scooter or three wheeler, and v) whether household owned automated farm equipment.
Second, a budget-expenditure schedule was administered to the "visibly poor" households to make the final determination of what type of card the household qualified for based on its perceived welfare status. The survey of households is carried out under the supervision of the Block Development Officer (BDO) 73 A revised BPL census methodology was proposed in 2002. However, the revised methodology was not implemented for legal reasons, but is expected to be fully operational this year. The primary difference between the 1997 and 2002 methodologies are that the former is excludes households based on certain criteria, while the latter is more in line with proxy means tests (PMT). PMTs allow households to be classified based collectively on a set of characteristics, without any one characteristic deciding the poverty status of a household. 74 Jalan and Murgai (2006 The remainder of this section employs the NSS data to study the coverage and incidence of BPL and AAY cards in UP. An analysis of whether or not the BPL census methodology is being followed at the local level is not undertaken here. Also beyond the scope of this paper is an analysis of alternate means of targeting poor households.
There is considerable variation in BPL incidence across geography and caste (Table  16 ). Almost a quarter of rural residents were BPL holders in 2002-03, while in urban areas only about 6 percent of residents were BPL holders. Across UP, the Eastern region had the highest proportion with 30 percent BPL card holders while the Western region had the lowest incidence of 10 percent. However, BPL coverage varies significantly across caste categories. The 37 percent of SC/STs, a fifth of OBCs, and 9 percent of non-backward castes are BPL card holders.
Possession of BPL cards reduces with increasing household welfare, implying a progressive distribution of BPL cards to the population. Almost 27 percent of households in the poorest fifth of the welfare distribution had a BPL card, while only 11 percent of those households in the top quintile had one. However, it remains that one in seven households from the richest 40 percent of households holds a below poverty line card.
Almost 13 percent of households did not have a ration card in 2002-03. The richest quintile of households has the highest proportion with no card (15.5 percent), but the second highest is among households in quintile 1 (12 percent). There is little variation across the middle three quintiles of the welfare distribution, with around 11.5 percent of those household with no card. Across urban and rural areas, the proportion of households with no card is 22 and 10 respectively. While across UP, the proportion of households without a 75 See Kriesel and Zaidi (1999) for more details on the process of canvassing and identifying BPL cardholders. 76 Kriesel and Zaidi (1999) used the 1997-98 UP-Bihar Survey of Living Conditions (SLC) to conduct their quantitative analysis. 77 In their discussion of inclusion and exclusion errors (points c and d), Kriesel and Zaidi (1999) report that their measure of poverty is also subject to measurement error.
card varies from 17.5 in the Central region to 8 percent in the Southern region. However, there is little variation between SC/STs and OBCs in the proportion of households reporting no card. Around 11.5 percent of households in these two social groups and 16 percent of households in non-backward castes have neither a BPL nor APL card. Much of the reduction in BPL/AAY card coverage is explained by the reduction in coverage of poor households (Table 17 ).
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To analyze the incidence of the almost 4 percentage point drop in BPL/AAY coverage between 1999-00 and 2002-03, we conduct marginal benefit incidence analysis. This exercise provides us with an estimate of the contribution to the total 4 percentage point drop for each of the 5 welfare quintiles. Therefore, for the poorest households, the proportion with BPL cards has fallen from 38 to 35 percent, implying 19 percent of the total reduction in the state. Even though there was a drop in the proportion of people with BPL cards across all quintiles, more than 50 percent of the entire decline is explained by the decline experienced by the poorest 40 percent, while less than 30 percent of the entire decline is explained by the richest 40 percent. In other words, there has been a disproportionately high reduction in the proportion of poorer households with access to BPL card relative to richer households. Between 1999-00 and 2002-03, the proportion of households with no card has increased from 9.6 to 12.7 percent, mostly explained by non-poor households not having any ration card. The increase in the proportion of households with no card has taken place across all household quintiles. However, much of the increase has occurred because of the increase in the proportion of households with no card in richer households. In fact, 55 percent of the total increase in the proportion of households with no card is due to the top 40 percent of the welfare distribution, while only 23 percent of the total increase is due to the bottom 40 percent of the welfare distribution. 
E. Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper assesses the performance of nine social safety net programs implemented in Uttar Pradesh. The primary criteria for assessment are: i) coverage, ii) targeting efficiency; iii) adequacy; and iv) challenges to proper service delivery during implementation. This section points to some of the policy shifts that would be needed to improve the performance of these programs.
Increase the fraction of the targeted population covered by a majority of programs. Even the school-grain distribution program, which has the best coverage of all the programs analyzed here, covers less than half the intended population. Efforts will have to be channeled to increase coverage and enable vulnerable groups of people to benefit from existing safety nets. There have, however, been some positive developments in this regard. For example, the implementation of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) in 200 districts across India, including 22 districts in UP, has the potential to make a positive impact. Among other things, the NREGA is expected to help increase the number of beneficiaries and also increase the impact of the program on household welfare though an increased number of days of work available to volunteers.
Decrease inclusion errors.
Inclusion errors draw on program budgets and while at the same time have no impact on the intended eligible population. As a result, the number of needy households benefiting from the program can be increased with minimal impact on government budgets if the programs reduce inclusion errors.
Reduce geographic disparities in program coverage and take-up. Being a large state, both in the sense of area and population, geographic disparities in program performance are likely. In this respect, UP is no different, showing signs of extreme geographic disparities with some programs like the public works and the targeted public distribution system. However, with careful monitoring, the disparities can be addressed and with more equitable service delivery.
If these social safety net programs are intended to alleviate the welfare of poor households, the amount of the transfers may have to increase. Only the social assistance programs like the NOAPs, appear to affect households appreciably although coverage is small. Other programs, especially those with wider coverage, like the school scholarship and grain distribution programs, increase household welfare by a negligible amount. The public works schemes (SGRY) have a small impact on household welfare primarily because participants in the program can only receive wages for a few days of the year. If these programs are to have a welfare enhancing impact on poor households, then it may be necessary to increase the value of the transfer to households. More work will be needed to evaluate the optimal transfer -weighing the implications on government budgets with the impact on household welfare and household behavior.
Although many of the above recommendations point to more monitoring and evaluation, there are also several instances in which recommendations from previous studies are not being implemented. Regular and credible monitoring and evaluation is needed and in this respect some problems need to be ironed out. For example, large discrepancies between monitoring of the SGRY by using muster rolls and monitoring through household surveys suggest a need for improving the methodology for measuring program outcomes. A related problem to the issue of monitoring and evaluation of government programs is that the lessons from those previous studies are not leading to sufficient reforms. In other words, feedback mechanisms to ensure that positive experiences are replicated and negative ones are not repeated are lacking. The Targeted Public Distribution System is a case in point. It is possibly one of the most widely studied programs in the world, but the lessons from those studies remain unimplemented. However, there are also some signs that the government is making some positive reforms.
Here again, the implementation of the NREGA is relevant, with a real indication that the government intends to improve on the existing workfare programs. However, it is too early to make a definitive assessment on the success on the measures.
